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Abstract 
Currently the most frequently used tools for investigating and learning from industrial 
accidents are based on linear, reductionist models of event causality. It has been 
suggested that complex socio-technical systems exhibit non-linear behaviour, 
incompatible with these approaches. An alternative approach based on system 
dynamics group model building is proposed and investigated within the context of the 
civil nuclear industry. The success and feasibility of the approach is assessed though 
the analysis of a case study event by a group of industrial experts previously unfamiliar 
with system dynamics. A selection of the models produced are discussed. The 
investigation demonstrates the feasibility of the approach and its potential to provide 
additional insights and learning. A possible archetypal structure is also identified and 
described indicating the possibility of the discovery of further archetypes through this 
approach which could then be shared for contextual learning between organizations 
and industries.  
Key Words: System Dynamics, Group Model Building, Accident Analysis, 
Archetypes, Nuclear Industry 
 
Introduction 
Generally the analysis of accidents is conducted to provide learning so that actions can 
be taken to prevent reoccurrence of the same or similar events. The learning from events 
is shared within and between organizations and industries in order to improve safety and 
efficiency. The most widely used tools for accident analysis are based on linear, 
reductionist models of systems and causality. They deconstruct and reduce events into 
their smallest component parts; causality is implied from one part to the next such that 
they can be traced backwards through a chain of cause and effect to discover the „root 
cause‟. Some specialise in technical failures, some in human failures and others in 
organizational failures or a combination of these.  
These linear, sequential models of causality are the basis for the majority of tools used 
within the UK civil nuclear industry. They are often used alongside „epidemiological‟ 
models such as the „Swiss Cheese‟ barrier model (Reason, 1997), which go some way 
towards looking for latent errors in the wider organization. The Human Performance 
Enhancement System (HPES) is extensively used and introduces a toolbox into the 
nuclear industry which includes „Barrier Analysis‟, „Cause and Affect Analysis‟ and 
„Event and Causal Factors Charts‟ which are linear or multi-linear flow charts depicting 
chronological cause and effect chains of events. 
These tools have been extensively used and demonstrated that they are useful at 
illuminating what happened and providing insight into the reasons behind the event. 
They shape the way events are thought about, analysed and learnt from. However, there 
is a growing recognition, especially within those who have studied complex socio-
technical systems (Marais et al., 2004, Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002, Leveson, 2004, 
Le Coze, 2005, Reiman and Oedewald, 2007, Rasmussen, 1997) that the current tools 
are being pushed to the limits of their abilities by the complexity and characteristics of 
the systems within which they are being applied.  
Perhaps the most interesting characteristics identified in these industries are the fact that 
they are accelerating faster than the regulatory and legal frameworks that oversee them 
(Kirwan, 2001) and that they are made up of non-linear cause-effect relationships (Le 
Coze, 2005) which are governed by feedback (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002).  
The Systems Theory paradigm is based firmly on the concept that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. With this in mind any model or any tool that looks solely at 
discrete events or failures is not necessarily seeing the full picture. With a Systems 
perspective, the interaction between the components is more important than the 
components themselves. Likewise the nature of the connections and interactions 
between the components is often not linear. In reality complex systems are made up of 
components imposing controls on other components and receiving feedback from one 
another, adapting their behaviour accordingly. Therefore, it can similarly be concluded 
that any model or tool that does not take feedback into account is providing a limited 
view of the incident.  
Studies and assessments of accident models and their associated tools (Qureshi, 2007, 
Hollnagel, 2008, Qureshi et al., 2007, Leveson, 2001, Sklet, 2004) provide an 
overviews of their development and show a move towards Systems Theory. One 
particular idea in this field is Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1984) which suggests 
that accidents can be a function of the complexity and coupling that exists within a 
system as opposed to the reliability of the social and technical components in isolation. 
Complexity is a way of describing the interactions and relationships that can exist or 
occur in the system, from linear to complex, while coupling refers to how quickly 
information or actions can propagate through the system. Wolf and Sampson (2007) 
demonstrated this theory with an analyses of oil refineries which showed those with 
more complexity and tighter coupling had more recorded accidents than those more 
linear with loose coupling. However this structural view can be seen by some to be too 
deterministic in its approach (Pidgeon, 1998). 
According to Perrow Nuclear Power Plants are at the top of both spectrums, having 
highly complex interactions and being tightly coupled. Hollnagel (2008) revisited this 
classification, and suggested that the tools currently used (Root Cause Analysis, Human 
Performance Enhancement System, the Swiss Cheese Model) are all tailored towards 
industries with loose coupling and linear (or manageable) interactions. Following from 
these studies into complex socio-technical systems a number of accident models and 
event analysis tools have been developed in recent years which adopt a Systems 
paradigm of event analysis including the AcciMapping (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) 
Functional Resonance Accident Model (Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004) and the Systems 
Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004). 
Building on an earlier initial investigation (Carhart, 2009) the following sections 
propose the use of system dynamics group model building as a tool for event 
investigation. This is explored in an example case through a workshop of experts. The 
methodology used is discussed and analysed before the viability and potential of the 
tool is assessed through a critique and discussion of the output.   
 
Previous uses of System Dynamics in Accident Analysis  
System dynamics is proposed and investigated as an alternative tool for accident 
investigation, for communicating the learning points and to provide insight on which to 
base corrective actions. System dynamics has already been used in accident 
investigations, for example as contribution to a STAMP analysis (Leveson et al., 2003, 
Leveson, 2004) of events within the water industry and the aerospace industry.  
The use of system dynamics in project management was used as a basis for Hansen and 
Golay‟s (1997) suggestion that it should be  more widely adopted within the nuclear 
industry, specifically in such areas as risk analysis, the diagnosis of problems and 
testing of suggested mitigations. It has subsequently been used to understand factors 
behind the Chernobyl accident (Salge and Milling, 2006) and in specific areas 
concerning operational issues with safety case production at civil nuclear generation 
sites in the UK (Carhart, 2009). System dynamics has also been used to analyse the 
underlying causes of the Westray mine disaster (Cooke, 2003) and combat vehicle 
accidents (Minami and Madnick, 2009). Sterman (2001), Cooke and Rohleder (2006) 
and latterly Goh et al. (2010) have advocated its use to introduce Systems Thinking 
concepts to the analysis of major accidents.  
 
Archetypes 
By looking at the causal structure and dynamics behind the incidents and learning from 
them, the warning signs (events and behaviours) for high loss hazards become more 
apparent and the organization can be more prepared for their emergence. These warning 
signs may take the form of common patterns of behaviour or structure which are 
witnessed prior to an event. These common behaviours and patterns or system 
archetypes have been identified in various contexts by authors such as Senge (1990) and 
Wolstenholme (2003). Senge popularised the notion of system archetypes in The Fifth 
Discipline (Senge, 1990) in which he identified eight common behaviours which could 
be characterized by simple feedback loops and represented using basic causal loop 
diagrams. This lead to the identification of seven safety archetypes (Marais et al., 2006) 
and investigations into catastrophe archetypes (Mrotzek and Ossimitz, 2008). 
Kim and Burchill (1992) suggested those working within the field of system dynamics 
had “downplayed” the power of simple pen and paper tools, placing emphasis on 
methodology and computer simulation. They argue from a Total Quality Management 
(TQM) perspective that simple pen and paper archetypes using system dynamics 
conventions can in fact be more powerful than many TQM tools. 
A modular approach to the construction of system dynamics models was suggested by 
Wolstnholme and Coyle (1983) and later expanded by Wolstenholme (2003, 2004) who 
proposed the identification and use of basic system dynamic templates from which 
models can be built. These generic templates consist of a loop showing the intended 
consequences, and a loop showing the unintended consequences. The basic structures 
form problem archetypes and solution archetypes. Using this as a basis, he stated there 
are only four truly generic problem/solution archetypes. These four can be used to 
construct the eight archetypes identified by Senge implying they are indeed more 
generic. This of course does not suggest they are necessarily more useful at 
communicating the relevant issues but they may be useful for constructing models 
which do. Knowledge of these archetypes can help in diagnosing problems and 
prescribing solutions. An intention of using system dynamics and related tools as a 
means to investigate and explore accidents is to build a catalogue of models from which 
common patterns or archetypes can be identified. These can be communicated across 
and between industries, both in terms of precursor and solution archetypes so proactive 
action can be taken to prevent hazards emerging. 
 
Group Model Building 
During its early stages system dynamics was typically applied in a consultant/client 
engagement (Forrester, 2007), but over the past twenty years there has been increasing 
focus on group model building, actively involving the „client‟ in the process of model 
building. Lane argues that the problem of the consultant as „expert modeller‟ hinders 
successful interventions, that clients simply do not believe or trust models presented to 
them by an external consultant (Lane, 1992). Forrester (1991) argues that focussing on 
„measured data‟ neglects the “far richer and more informative body of information that 
exists in the knowledge and experience of those in the active, working world” (p.5). 
Group model building has emerged as a methodology for not only gathering data from 
people, but capturing their interpretations of the causality present in the system (Vennix, 
1999, Vennix, 1995, Vennix et al., 1992). It allows for greater integration of the 
stakeholders into the project. In a summary of the relevant literature Richardson et al. 
(1989) outline the key tasks in constructing system dynamics models in groups as; 
 Eliciting information 
 Exploring courses of action 
 Evaluating situations 
There is benefit in group model building as opposed to models being built by 
individuals. Groups are more likely to question one another, and although there is of 
course a risk of „group think‟, it is certainly less of a risk than when performed by an 
individual. It has been shown (Shaw, 1932 cited in, Richardson et al., 1989) that groups 
posses a better ability to filter out false information than individuals. Groups allow for a 
range of expertise to be provided, as well as those of different backgrounds with 
different views. Group model building of system dynamics models also makes the 
participants explicitly discuss their otherwise implicit assumptions regarding causality 
(Vennix, 1999). There are many different potential approaches to conducting group 
model building. It could be conducted in a strongly structured way or weakly structured 
way, by presenting the group with a model and allowing them to discuss it, or producing 
one collaboratively step by step (Richardson et al., 1989). Practical approaches to 
designing a group model building engagement can be constructed from a growing 
literature on the subject (Rouwette et al., 2000, Rouwette et al., 2002, Vennix, 1999, 
Richardson et al., 1992, Andersen and Richardson, 1997, Oyo et al., 2009, Vo et al., 
2007, Visser, 2007, van der Smagt, 2005, Rouwette and Vennix, 2006, Rouwette et al., 
2009, Andersen et al., 2007, Vennix et al., 1992) .  
 
Workshop 
A one-day workshop was held in order to investigate the potential and practicality of 
using system dynamics through a group model building approach to analyse and 
investigate significant events. The workshop involved a group of nine experts from 
within the nuclear industry and related academic fields, including representation from 
the regulator authority, civil nuclear operators and safety systems research.  
The scope of the attendees‟ expertise was diverse, though the majority had little or no 
previous experience of using system dynamics. The workshop used a criticality accident 
at a nuclear fuel conversion facility in Tokai-Mura, Japan in 1999 as a case study. Prior 
knowledge of this event was also varied. Some had a general understanding while 
others had studied the event previously. All of the participants were external to the 
event being investigated and there was no input from, or access to anyone directly 
involved in it. The information used was second hand, contained in the reports of 
official investigation bodies (Nuclear Safety Commission, 1999, International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 1999, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2000) and collated through 
document analysis. The source of the information is important as it has an influence 
over the nature and scope of the models constructed. 
Two weeks before the workshop the participants were given a brief information pack 
with some short descriptions of the event and the tools that would be used. They were 
also given details of where they could find out more information, should they be 
interested in doing so.  
The group model building session was not intended to construct models to represent the 
mental models of the participants, but rather to understand the causality, development 
and evolution of the accident being investigated. In a different scenario, had some of the 
participants been directly involved in the incident, then it might be beneficial to explore 
their mental models with them using Causal Loop Diagrams.  
The participants were not a „client group‟ in that the task was not intended to produce a 
change in their thinking towards any event or system with which they are directly 
involved. They were aware of the experimental nature and that the analysis was of a 
system removed from their own. That is not to say that the potential learning points 
would not be applicable to them. The benefit of a systems approach on the 
comprehension and understanding of the group investigating the event was also of 
interest.  
 
Purpose 
The purpose of the workshop and the investigation as a whole was to assess the 
potential and feasibility of developing non-trivial system dynamics models at a sensible 
level of abstraction which provide useful insights, additional to those of the current 
approach, into soft issues that could be precursors to serious accidents. At this stage the 
models will not be used for prediction, instead the emphasis is on identifying archetypes 
which could provide learning and could be transferred between industries and 
organizations.  
Assessing the potential is relatively self explanatory of any investigation into a 
particular tool or methodology. It was emphasised to the workshop attendees to clarify 
that the investigation was not explicitly concerned with achieving a particular level of 
success from the models and diagrams, and that the participants should not be 
disheartened should there be a negative outcome from a one-day workshop. The second 
point was to assess the feasibility of using system dynamics. Assuming it could be 
shown to be an insightful means of investigating an incident, it was also necessary to 
demonstrate its practicability. Even if the approach proved insightful it could not be 
judged as a success or a useful addition to the current toolbox if it was impractical to 
implement. 
Thirdly the models needed to be constructed at a sensible level of abstraction, though 
exactly what that is depends on the particular case in question, the time and data 
constraints and the views of those involved in the group model building. The models 
should not be too complicated, but they should not be too trivial. The aim is for the 
models to provide insight into the structure of causality and underlying dynamics, while 
also demonstrating learning points that could be shared across industry boundaries. 
Whether or not these insights go beyond the current tools to give additional insight is 
also crucial to the assessment of the tool. A practicable tool is of little value if it does 
not enlighten the investigators into the causality of the accidents, and its ultimate 
successful adoption will be dependent on its perceived value at doing this. If it offers 
the same level of analysis as the current tools its uptake may be limited. It is possible 
however to argue that the added value comes from the systems thinking that is 
developed through the group model building of system dynamics models. Though the 
investigation may ultimately draw the same conclusions as analysis using the current 
tools, it will provide additional insight by modelling the situation in a different way, one 
that arguably better reflects the nature of the causality by exposing the underlying 
dynamics and feedback structure. 
System dynamics has its roots in a functionalist domain. However, to limit an accident 
analysis within a social-technical system to the physical, mechanical and hard elements 
would be detrimental. The purpose emphasises the need to look at the soft aspects at the 
socio-technical interface and beyond, that develop in the system as precursors to the 
emergence of significant events in the form of structures and patterns of behaviour that 
develop states conducive to hazard.  
The purpose also places special emphasis on the fact that the models were not going be 
used for prediction, but as a way of enhancing understanding and learning about the 
causality of these significant events which can be conveniently communicated and 
shared between different industries. This could be achieved by looking out for common 
precursor patterns of behaviour or structures in the form of generic archetypes.  
Although it would be unfeasible to produce models in a one-day workshop suitable for 
simulation, and gather the required data, the decision to not use the models for 
prediction at this stage was not based on this reasoning.  The implications of this are 
discussed in a later section. 
 
Method 
The approach for the workshop was developed from guidance provided by Sterman 
(2000) and Wolstenholme (1992) who outline methodologies for constructing system 
dynamics models and Vennix (1996) who provides direction on the design of group 
model building projects. Vennix presents a flow chart which advises that once system 
dynamics has been identified as a suitable tool, the first question to ask is whether or not 
to use a preliminary model; that is presenting a group of experts with a prebuilt model 
for discussion and refinement. The use of preliminary models has been previously 
demonstrated (Vennix et al., 1988), but in this instance although a preliminary model 
was built from document analysis it was not used. The preliminary model was built in 
case the participants of the workshop encountered too many difficulties in constructing 
a model given the restrictive time constraints. In practice it was not required and the 
models were created from scratch. 
On the day of the workshop, following introductions and a discussion of the purpose, 
the attendees were presented with a brief introduction to accident models, system 
dynamics and the particular event that was going to be investigated. This was seen as a 
necessity and therefore one of the “important exceptions” mentioned by Andersen and 
Richardson (1997) to their rule of avoiding long periods of one person delivering 
information to the rest of the group.  The participants were then given time to read 
through the official reports, followed by discussions about the case over lunch.  
The afternoon session focussed on analysing the event through the construction of 
system dynamics models. Although the workshop was investigating the potential and 
practicability of the approach, the aim of the model was ultimately the same as it would 
be in any accident analysis; to learn about the event, why it happened and then share 
this learning with others. 
The first step involved identifying the who, what, where and when in order to define the 
system boundary and constrain the model. Defining the problem under investigation 
also required defining the time frame the model will look at, what important variables 
exists internally to the system, and what exists outside of it.  
The important variables were derived from content analysis of the descriptions of the 
event in the previous accident reports. The participants did not all read the same 
accounts of the event. In order to make the process more efficient and stimulate debate 
the previous reports were distributed amongst the group.  
To retain the group‟s collective ability to filter out false information without the 
potential detrimental effects of group elicitation, participants were asked to brainstorm 
variables individually on post-it notes. These were then organized by the group 
members into one of three columns; 
 Stocks 
 Variables 
 Policy Variables 
The contributors analysed this output, discussed the suggestions, grouped similar terms 
and refined the lists. In doing this the group worked towards an agreed concept of the 
system boundary. 
The second stage worked towards forming a dynamic hypothesis; a theory explaining 
the observed behaviour in terms of feedback and control. The group began by 
discussing how the stocks were influenced. It quickly became apparent that the group 
were not yet comfortable with thinking in terms of flows, so the stocks were treated as 
pseudo-variables and the group instead began to identify feedback processes. In the 
course of the session the group went through several iterations of the same model to try 
and explain what were felt to be the most important issues from the case-study event.  
The iterative nature extended beyond the one-day workshop. Some of the initial models 
had several issues regarding the way some of the variables had been defined, these are 
discussed in a later section. After the workshop the models were refined without the 
participation of the attendees to develop what could be thought of as preliminary models 
for a second workshop and group model building session. This maintains a higher level 
of group interaction and subsequent buy-in to the conclusions than may be achieved by 
simply presenting them with a preliminary model developed without their involvement. 
This method, building on Vennix‟s (1996) method, can be represented as in Figure 1- 
Outline of MethodologyFigure 1.  
 
Figure 1- Outline of Methodology 
Results 
It is not the intention of this paper to discuss the event used in this study in any depth, or 
draw any detailed conclusions about the underlying causality, at least not to the extent a 
full accident investigation and analysis would. However, in order to discuss the models 
on a technical level, it is necessary to explain some of the terminology used, in 
particular the term „Safety Culture‟ which was felt to be very important by the 
workshop participants. Culture is a very hard term to define, and safety culture may be 
interpreted differently by different people. Within the nuclear industry it is a well 
 
established idea, and despite its „soft‟ nature, is accepted as a quantifiable entity. It can 
therefore be treated as a stock. Safety culture surveys are used throughout the nuclear 
industry on a regular basis in order to capture, quantify and benchmark an organizations 
safety culture. Nuclear Safety Culture is formally defined by the International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group in INSAG-4 (1991). Wiegmann et al (2002) found that despite 
different definitions of safety culture being used by different organizations there were 
actually many similarities. It tends to refer to the collective attitudes and values of the 
organization towards safety, and is acknowledged to affect the behaviours of the 
individuals.  
Safety culture is measured by looking at the behaviours and attitudes present within the 
organization; elements which are a product of the culture. The fact that safety culture is 
measured in this indirect way creates a potential issue that needs clarification as it 
caused some confusion during the workshop.  
If an individual within the organization has a questioning attitude then this is arguably 
the result of a good culture of safety. However when the organization comes to assess 
its tacit, somewhat intangible safety culture the presence of a questioning attitude within 
the employees is used as an indicator, gauged through interviews, questionnaires or 
similar means. This questioning attitude contributes to the perception that it has a good 
safety culture. The simple measured or inferred perception of the safety culture is a 
product of the attitudes developed by the actual more complicated and harder to define 
safety culture that exists in the collective of the employees. In other words the 
questioning attitude is a symptom of the safety culture, and this symptom shapes the 
diagnosis. An estimate of the safety culture is being inferred from the measurable things 
it influences or produces. There is nothing wrong with inferring the state of an 
inaccessible variable through measurement of its products where there is an accepted 
correlation. The fallacy is to then believe that this correlating product somehow causes 
the inaccessible variable to change, as it does the assessment of the inaccessible 
variable. The questioning attitude does not directly cause the actual safety culture to 
change as it does the measured and perceived safety culture. This is of course not to say 
that the symptomatic variable is not part of a larger feedback loop as monitoring the 
symptoms may result in corrective action. The danger arises from confusing the causal 
structure and dynamics of the diagnosis with that of the cause. When modelling 
physical systems such as filling up a sealed tank using an external gauge this situation 
can seem obvious, it is unlikely such a group of modellers would confuse the perceived 
state of the tank with the actual state. This difference is not so clear when dealing with 
tacit „soft‟ variables such as „compliance‟. However, ultimately in the models produced 
at the workshop the value of the measured and actual concept of safety culture are 
treated as equals. 
This section does not cover all of the models produced during the workshop; rather it 
focuses on two representations of one particularly interesting aspect which was 
discussed. The main learning points can be extracted and illustrated in order to 
communicate the most important issues. Some of these issues form the basis for 
potential archetypal structures of behaviour and are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 
below. 
Regulatory oversight was initially and logically believed by the group to be independent 
of the organization and its activities. It was therefore identified as a policy variable. 
However in constructing the very first model at the workshop it became apparent that 
for the event and system under investigation the degree of oversight was influenced by 
the number of event reports (notifications to the regulator of abnormal occurrences or 
substandard conditions) the organization was producing. One perception of this 
situation is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 - First Potential Safety Culture Archetype 
The top loop demonstrates the reinforcing effect of a good safety culture, as it 
encourages compliance, decreases the normalisation of unauthorised changes, therefore 
increasing vigilance for any outlining unauthorised deviations from approved actions 
and behaviours, strengthening the safety culture. Or if the opposite is the case an 
erosion of the safety culture results in unauthorised changes becoming accepted as the 
norm, this normalisation disguises the inherent danger in deviating from the approved 
process. Vigilance to these unauthorised deviations and the associated potential risks 
decreases, reinforcing the decline of the safety culture by reducing the means by which 
it is thought to increase. This is however balanced by the paradoxical notion set up by 
the feedback loop involving oversight. As safety improves, the number of reportable 
events, and therefore reported events can decrease. The paradoxical behaviour is 
induced if the regulator perceives this lack of event reports as an indication that the 
system is safe, and reduces the degree of oversight it provides. This may especially be 
the case if the regulator has limited resources or a preconceived notion that the system is 
safe. In this example the management‟s role is seen as reducing or preventing 
complacency and the erosion of safety culture (which is self reinforcing). But, with less 
regulatory oversight the management are also under the impression the system is safe 
and disconnected from reinforcing the importance of safely following the procedures as 
approved. This situation assumes the workforce is not proactively or maliciously acting 
in an unsafe way. 
This draws parallels with the archetype “Decreasing safety consciousness” identified by 
Marais et al. (2006) and Cooke and Rohleder‟s (2006) models looking at learning from 
incidents in high-hazard industries. Marais et al. cite Amalberti (2001) to suggest that 
initiatives to reduce the number of reportable events can have the unintended 
consequence of reducing situational awareness and actually decreasing the safety of the 
system.  
A different view of the same situation also posited from the workshop is shown in 
Figure 3. Here the role of management is seen as actively enhancing and strengthening 
the safety culture by developing and encouraging the awareness of potential hazards. 
This is subtly different from having a direct affect on complacency. The reinforcing 
loop produces a similar situation. If the safety culture declines, compliance declines and 
unauthorised changes become the norm. Again these unauthorised changes are not 
perceived as dangerous and so complacency develops as they become an accepted part 
of operation, this actively erodes the safety culture further. This time the balancing loop 
will drive up risk awareness if the safety culture declines and the number of 
unauthorised changes increases. The difference between the two models is that in Figure 
2 a good safety culture is self-sustaining and the lack of oversight causes it to erode, in 
Figure 3 an improved safety culture does not automatically result in further 
improvement, this has to come from the oversight.  
 
Figure 3 - Second Potential Safety Culture Archetype 
The workshop discussions and output demonstrated that there can be more than one 
view on the same situation. This of course presents the issue that there is more than one 
„correct‟ model that could be constructed. But constructing these models made the 
underlying assumptions explicit, and illuminated the differences in approach and 
thought. This said, they all shared the same sense of potential for a paradoxical and 
hazardous situation to develop. The true paradox is that an organization with a 
genuinely good safety culture will produce event reports as it is driven to learn from all 
of its incidents and near misses and conversely an organization with a poor safety 
culture will not be driven to learn and may not report as many events despite having 
more. This is a situation where the number of event reports does not necessarily reflect 
the number of incidents. In such a situation it would be incorrect to assume that a poor 
safety culture and a more unsafe system are indicated by a large number of near miss 
and event reports. If the management or regulator believe this to be true then the system 
can be allowed to progress further and further towards a hazardous state, to a point 
where a small deviation can cause it to fail in a significant way. This situation, as was 
seen in the event being studied, is clearly represented by slightly modifying the two 
models above to make the ignorance of the actual number of events, and the incorrect 
emphasis on the number of event reports clearer. This is shown in Figure 4 where the 
dotted line shows the missing connection. With this situation two reinforcing feedback 
loops are set up with no balancing loop which would be provided by the missing 
connection.  
 
 
(a)                                                                                       (b) 
Figure 4 - Error of Reported Events over Reportable Events 
 
Discussion 
Modelling the incidents using SD and Causal Loop Diagrams presented three interesting 
challenges – i) dealing with soft variables, ii) deciding whether simulation is necessary, 
and iii) the question of validation, Interestingly, these are not independent and their 
resolution is discussed here. 
Initially, the most difficult challenge was how to deal with „soft‟ variables. These 
variables, which include terms such as „compliance‟ or „commitment‟ are important to 
the behaviours which emerge from the system, however, there is often no objective 
methodology for their measurement, and no agreed dimensions. Assuming it were 
possible to assess them on an agreed or dimensionless scale, the quantitative nature of 
their influence on other variables is unknown or difficult to capture. Finding them in our 
group modelling exercise was not unexpected; for example, system dynamics models of 
NASA safety culture include similar soft variables (Leveson, 2005). There is an 
argument for capturing and quantifying such information from experts. Research 
methods from the social sciences routinely deal with such variables through the theory 
of scale types (Stevens, 1946). However, Coyle  (2000) warned that simulations using 
these types of variables could be a misuse of the tools, going so far as to label it 
“absurd” (p.238). This warning is based on the grounds that quantifying terms that have 
no easily defined meaning suggests a misleading level of accuracy. Acknowledging that 
this is the case Fowler (2003) however suggests that these variables must be included, 
even if the results are “less than perfect from a numerically scientific 
perspective”(p.140). If these „soft‟ variables are not included, then a mathematically 
consistent model can be used to run simulations, but it would imply that the omitted 
factors have no impact on the system. Including them may result in unsatisfactory 
simulations. In both scenarios there is a risk of producing misleading results. However, 
our purpose was to look for useful archetypes and these can be purely qualitative in 
nature and not require simulation at all. It has been argued (Coyle, 2000, Wolstenholme, 
1999, Wolstenholme and Coyle, 1983) that building the models, providing it is done 
rigorously, can be beneficial as an enhancement to linear thinking even without 
simulation. This is also sufficient for the purpose of identifying structural and 
behavioural archetypes.  
Others (Homer and Oliva, 2001) working in this area have concluded that simulation 
nearly always adds value and is therefore favourable over causal loop diagrams. 
Furthermore they suggest that even with significant uncertainties the results of 
simulations would never by more misleading than trying to interpret the diagrams. Lane 
(2008) warned that only those experienced in simulating system dynamics models 
should consider stopping at the diagram stage if it were necessary to do so. Only those 
aware of the potentially counter intuitive results observed through simulations will be 
conscious of the dangers and common mistakes of logic that can occur from analysing 
static diagrams. If the nature of the investigation means the analysis must be conducted 
using static causal loop and stock and flow diagrams then of course these dangers 
cannot be discounted. There is no doubt that a rigorous dynamic simulation is preferable 
to a static diagram, however for some situations rigorous simulation is not possible. The 
extra effort required quantifying soft variables and their relationships in order to 
produce a satisfactory model for simulation might not be justified by the quality of the 
results. The question of what constitutes quality is important, but in terms of practicality 
for this application the debate needs to be reframed in terms of the original purpose.  
The purpose of an accident investigation is to learn about the causality in order to 
prevent reoccurrence of the event. The purpose of identifying archetypes is to generate 
insight into patterns of behaviour and the underlying structure of the causality that could 
be precursors to incidents, these insights can then be used to modify those behaviours 
before an incident does occur i.e. the systems is self aware and changes itself, the 
simulation then becomes moot. Identifying archetypes allows experts in system 
dynamics to suggest corrective or preventative actions. When an existing archetype is 
recognised within an organisation the corresponding guidance on correction or 
prevention can be introduced. Also, it has previously been demonstrated (Senge, 1990, 
Kim and Burchill, 1992, Marais et al., 2006) that un-simulated causal loop diagrams 
like those produced here are sufficient for communicating archetypal structures 
This investigation set out to assess whether the approach has the potential to provide 
insights that the current tools based on the classic linear and reductionist models of 
event causality do not. The case study discussed in this paper certainly suggests that this 
is the case. The conclusions may be similar to those of the original investigations, and 
the structures of the models may reflect archetypes already identified, but the process of 
group model building delivered an insight into the causality that the existing tools 
would not. The engagement and understanding of the participants can be enhanced. The 
investigation also aimed to assess the feasibility and practicability of the approach. 
Although there was a degree of refinement after the workshop to clear up some issues, 
the majority of the models were constructed or discussed during the one-day workshop, 
with little or no prior knowledge of system dynamics or the event. More time would be 
required to draw any firm conclusions about the event, but it is certainly conceivable 
that the approach could be practicable in incident analysis, both as part of active 
investigation and retrospective learning.  
While it is not possible to identify common precursor archetypes from one case study, 
the fact that a structure similar to archetypes already proposed was developed, 
describing similar behaviours, suggests it is possible. 
For qualitative models the question of validation revolves around the structure of the 
model and the relationships it documents by experts or those involved in the event being 
investigated. (Barlas, 1996) regards validation as part of a “purposeful social contract” 
in which the structure of a model generates a “causal descriptive” correspondence with 
observed behaviour, do we get “right behaviour for the right reason?” (p.187). System 
dynamics models are ideally suited to this appeal to structuralism or as Lane puts it 
“rerum cognoscere causas” (Lane, 2001a, Lane, 2001b). When we contrast this position 
with a logical positivist view that our model is an objective representation of the real 
world we can thus avoid the question of whether the model is right or wrong, it is 
merely one possible model on a continuum of usefulness. In this case, usefulness is part 
of the aim of any event investigation – to learn and make corrective actions so as to 
prevent recurrence and ultimately to make the system safer. Again it has already been 
discussed that a group model building approach can add value by providing an 
alternative view of the event to that presented by existing techniques, and as such can 
give a richer understanding of the causal factors that require attention. 
Within large organizations, studying accidents and undesirable events goes beyond the 
initial accident investigation. Often a safety culture is nurtured through continued 
learning and discussion of these events across industries. The benefits of the systems 
approach also stand for their application in this area. The use of system dynamics in 
school and college education has been discussed by Forrester (1992), where he says 
“Students are stuffed with facts without having a frame of reference for making those 
facts relevant to the complexities of life” (p.5). A similar criticism could be directed at 
„learning organizations‟ that encourage their staff to continually improve and develop 
their knowledge particularly in the area of safety and industrial accidents. The level of 
operating experience available can be overwhelming, with no framework as to how 
these descriptions of events can be applicable in a meaningful way. In discussing an 
approach to an effective incident learning system Cooke and Rohleder (2006) reiterate 
the need to go beyond the identification of „root causes‟ to analyse causal structures. 
 
The importance and nature of learning in high-hazard industries has been investigated in 
great detail, with Carroll et al. (2002) among others, providing insight and overview. 
They suggest that their studies of nuclear power industry investigations revealed they 
were focused on local process without going into the “deep learning” stage of the 
underlying processes. This deep learning, they say, is obtained through systems models. 
A similar conclusion is drawn by Huber et al. (2009) from their safety audit of a 
chemical site which identified learning within the organization as a disjointed, local 
activity. They talk of the need to “close the loop of learning” (p.94), and the employees‟ 
frustration that there was a lack of transparency of the causes of events, as they were not 
involved in the learning process. Instead failures at other plants were collected by the 
safety department and posted onto the intranet.  
In complex socio-technical systems, especially those prone to high impact, low 
probability events, safety is as much a construct of its ability to effectively react to new 
and unique developments as it is its ability to follow existing processes well. Rehearsing 
emergency plans and ensuring they have been learnt is not sufficient (Lagadec, 1997). 
Preparing for these unique developments can be achieved through effective deep 
learning that could be provided by the group model building of causal loop diagrams 
and system dynamics models for retrospective and external events as well as internal 
investigations.  
 
Conclusions 
The investigation demonstrates the feasibility of the approach and shows its potential to 
provide additional insights to the current tools by virtue of its Systems Theory, feedback 
focused process. The conclusions may not be different, but the understanding of the 
causality can be enhanced, and may lead to the identification of further archetypal 
structures and patterns of behaviour.    
As mentioned previously, any archetypes extracted from these models are not unique, 
but this is not entirely unsurprising. If the previously identified archetypes are true 
archetypes then it should be expected that they would be seen in other systems and 
incidents. It is important to recall though that the participants in the workshop had 
limited or no prior knowledge of system dynamics. Through discussions and adopting a 
Systems Theory approach to accident analysis they developed models that recognise 
and reinforce the existence of these common patterns of behaviour. In a group model 
building workshop they discovered and elicited, from the prose of the written reports, 
important issues surrounding the underlying dynamic structure of the causality of the 
event.  
The introduction of system dynamics into the event analysis toolbox, both for internal 
investigations and the extraction of learning through the exploration of external events 
could improve the understanding of their underlying causality. This could produce deep 
learning with a dynamic and contextual appreciation not provided by the current models 
and tools. Further study is required, but through more group model building workshops 
it is hoped the knowledge and understanding of the participants and organizations can 
be improved while further archetypes are discovered, existing ones are verified and 
related solutions are developed. This learning can then be shared effectively between 
organizations.  
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